I.
INTRODUCTION
Wireless sensor network (WSN) is a new network structure which consists of small nodes also called motes. These motes can be used to monitor physical or environmental conditions around them such as temperature, sound, vibration etc, process data, and communicate through wireless links [1] . In WSN, wireless sensors communicate each other by using of a radio link. WSNs are widely used these days and are very popular in research for use of embedded systems in our daily life. WSNs are used in applications involving monitoring, tracking, or controlling such as habitat monitoring, robotic toys, battlefield monitoring, packet insertion [2, 3] , traffic monitoring, object tracking and nuclear reactor control.
Usually, we protect message confidentiality by using encryption program, and use digital signature technology to prevent messages from being forged. Compared to the using of the above two techniques, Zheng [4] proposed the signcryption technology which is more applicable to resource-constrained networks. Signcryption scheme is a cryptographic primitive that provides both these properties together in an efficient way. Adi Shamir [5] introduced the concept of identity based cryptography. The idea of identity based cryptography is to enable a user to use any arbitrary string (such as name, Identity number, Email address, etc.) as his public key.
Identity based cryptography serves as an efficient alternative to Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) based systems. ID-based signcryption was first studied by Malone-Lee et al. [6] . ID-based cryptography does not require public key authentication, it has a higher efficiency of computing and communications, and more suitable. Formally, some ID-based signcryption algorithms are designed for WSN security communications [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] . The results show that the ID-based signcryption technology plays an important role to improve the safety and efficiency of WSN.
In order to further improve the safety and efficiency of the WSN communication, this paper designs a provably secure signcryption algorithm based on the Identity, the computation and transmission costs of the algorithm is small, which can better meet the needs of the WSN that having fixed topology, distributed management, and resource-constrained environment.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews some definitions and security modes. Our proposed scheme is described in Section 3. The security of our scheme is analyzed in Section 4. Section 5 gives the conclusion.
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PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we review some background knowledge including the bilinear pairing and DiffieHellman problem. We also provide the generic mode and security notions necessary to build our signcryption scheme in this section. We refer the reader to [13] [14] [15] for a discussion of how to build a concrete instance using supersingular curves and compute the bilinear map.
a. Bilinear pairings and Diffie-Hellman problem
We briefly review the bilinear pairing. Let G 1 denote an additive group of prime order p and G2 be a multiplicative group of the same prime order. Let ê: G 1 ×G 1 →G 2 be a bilinear mapping with the following properties:
ab , for all P, Q∈ G 1 , and a, b
There is an efficient algorithm to compute ê(P, Q) for any P, Q G 1 .
The security of our scheme relies on the hardness of the following problems. 
Phase I:
The adversary A performs a polynomially bounded number of queries to C. The queries made by A may be adaptive, i.e. current query may depend on the answers to the previous queries.
The various oracles and the queries made to these oracles are defined below:
(1) Key extraction queries: A produces an identity ID i and receives the private key K i . Note that the adversary is allowed to make a key extraction query on identity ID i in the above definition. This condition corresponds to the stringent requirement of the insider security for confidentiality of signcryption. It also ensures the forward security of the scheme. 
The advantage of A is defined as the probability that it wins. Note that the adversary is allowed to make a key extraction query on the identity ID j in the above definition. This condition is considered to the stringent requirement of insider security for signcryption.
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In this section, we propose a new ID-based signcryption which can be efficient used in WSN.
The following shows the details of our scheme. 
Signcrypt:
To send a message m to user B with identity ID B , user A with identity ID A follows the steps below.
(1) Choose
(2) Compute U = xP. The correctness can be easily verified by the following equations. 
ê(P, V) = ê(P, xP pub
+ rK A ) = ê(xP, P pub )ê(P, rK A ) = ê(U, P pub ) ê(P, rSQ A ) = ê(U, P pub ) ê(SP, Q A ) r = ê(U, P pub )ê(P pub ,Q
Proof.
The interaction between A and C can be viewed as a game given in definition 3. Assume the distinguisher C is provided with a random instance (P, aP, bP, cP) of the CBDH problem.
His goal is to compute ê(P, P) abc . C will run A as a subroutine and act as A's challenger in the IND-IDSC-CCA2 game. During the game, A will consult C for answers to the random oracles H 1 ,
respectively in giving the responses to the queries. These answers are randomly generated, but to maintain the consistency and to avoid collision.
Setup:
For having the game with A, C chooses P pub = aP and gives A the system parameters (G 1 , G 2 , q, P, P pub ). Note that a is unknown to C, this value simulates the master secret key value for the PKG in the game.
Phase I: During phase I, A is allowed to access the various oracles provided by C. A can get sufficient training before generating the forgery. The various oracles provided by C to A during training are as follows.
• H 1 Oracle Queries (Ω H1 ): When this oracle is queried with ID i by A, C responds as follows. C chooses a random number i 0 {1, 2, . . ., q H1 }, where q H1 is the maximum bounded number of allowed queries by A. At the i 0 -th query, C answers by
Otherwise, sets
• , A chooses to be challenged using the receiver with identity ID i0 . Hence the probability that A's response is helpful to C is Taking into account all the probabilities that C will not fail its simulation, the value of Adv(C) is calculated as follows, Adv(C) = 
Proof.
The interaction between A and C can be viewed as a game given in definition 4. When C is provided with a random instance (P, aP, bP) of the CDH problem. C can use A as a subroutine and act as A's challenger in the EUF-CMA game to compute abP. During the game, A will consult C for answers to the random oracles H 1 , H 2 and
Setup:
For having the game with A, C chooses P pub = aP and gives A the system parameters (G 1 , G 2 , q, P, P pub ). Note that a is unknown to C, this value simulates the master secret key value for the PKG in the game. , A chooses to be challenged using the receiver with identity ID i0 .
Hence the probability that A's response is helpful to C is 
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have proposed a new ID-based signcryption scheme based on the bilinear pairings. Confidentiality, integrity, non-repudiation and authentication are the important requirements for many cryptographic applications. We discussed the security of the newly proposed scheme in the random oracle model in detail. The results are that our scheme satisfies the confidentiality, the unforgeability, and the public verfiability. Thus, we have the conclusion that our scheme is fit for using in wireless sensor networks. 
